Buyouts under the threat of preemption by Tarsalewska, M
Buyouts under the threat of preemption
Monika Tarsalewska∗
University of Exeter Business School
Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4ST, United Kingdom
January 26, 2018
Abstract
This paper analyses the effects of preemption fears on the buyout efficiency when firms
combine non-synergistic operational activities and have asymmetric access to financing.
Bidders with preemption fears are more likely to acquire target firms at an earlier
development stage. However, if uncertainty is high, an acquirer may opt to wait and
buy the target firm at a later stage as assets in place. The fear of preemption affects the
efficient exercise of each offer differently. While the timing of a hostile takeover under
threat of preemption converges to an efficient global optimiser threshold, negotiated
mergers are exercised inefficiently too early. Premiums to the target firm are higher
when the firm is acquired at an earlier stage, and when the bidder fears being preempted.
Keywords: Buyouts, Real Options, Fear of Preemption
JEL Classification: G34, G13, G32
∗I thank Bart Lambrecht, Elizabeth Whalley, Maria Cecilia Bustamante, and Grzegorz Pawlina for
valuable suggestions and comments. E-mail: m.tarsalewska@exeter.ac.uk. This project received co-
funding from the European Unions Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie
Skodowska-Curie grant agreement No 665778 and National Science Center, Poland under the grant agreement
2016/23/P/HS4/04032 POLONEZ.
1
1. Introduction
Buyouts are a quite important form of ownership change in the mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) market. Acquirers in this market are mostly financial intermediaries such as private
equity funds. Many target firms rely on the funding provided by financial intermediaries.
Relatively cheaper financing provided by these intermediaries may create financial synergies.
For example, Mr Reynolds the CEO of Puget Energy and PSE explained a rationale behind
the recent deal as “The merger will provide us with USD 5 billion over the next five years,
insulating us from volatility in the public equity markets. Partnering with the Consortium,
which is comprised of committed and experienced long-term infrastructure investors, will
provide the best end result for our customers, our employees and the communities we serve
in western Washington. This will be business as usual, only better.”1
The buyout market is quite competitive and the M&A transaction is typically a complex
decision. Firms must decide on the terms and timing of the acquisition under the fear of
preemption. However, there is contradictory evidence on how competition affects the deal.
For example, there are concerns among investors and policymakers that competition reducing
behavior through forming consortiums, harms target shareholders, yet on the other hand it
has been shown that reduced competition does not always harm target shareholders (Boone
and Mulherin (2011)). Moreover, private equity firms are typically perceived as investors in
mature markets, yet they often also buy growth capital (Phalippou (2014)).2
It remains an open question, then, how (i) the offer type, (ii) firm-life cycle, and (iii)
competition among bidders interact to form both the terms and timing of acquisitions made
by a financial intermediaries. Consider recent developments in the private equity market in
the US where a raise in the number of private equity firms increases the competition among
them for the potential set of target firms. Many offers are made as takeovers where the
target typically gains bargaining power over the price. Yet, there are also firms that decide
to negotiate the deals first.
This paper studies how competition affects deal efficiency (i.e. M&A surplus) in a dynamic
1Zephyr, Deal No 588261
2“Titans turn attention to Silicon Valley”, Financial Times, 2015
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environment, depending on the offer type, where the bidder has to decide on whether to
acquire the target firm early as a growth option (i.e., prior to commercialization), or whether
to wait and acquire it later, as assets generating profits. The buyout market provides an
intuitive setting to study the effects of competition on the timing of a friendly merger or
hostile offer and its efficiency. Friendly mergers occur when firms enter into agreement to
acquire and the division of M&A surplus and timing are negotiated simultaneously, while
during hostile takeovers the target dictates the terms and the acquirer subsequently decides
on the timing.
I address a number of novel research questions in this study. First, I explore the character-
istics that determine the choice between acquiring the target as a growth option or as assets
in place. Second, I examine whether the synergies differ depending on the target firm’s stage
of development. Third, I analyse how the fear of preemption affects each type of offer, either
friendly merger or hostile takeover. I find that firms tend to be acquired as growth options
if uncertainty is low and the acquirer fears being preempted. Furthermore, the acquirer is
more likely to buy the target as a growth option if corporate taxes are higher, the target is
small, and if it has a high growth rate and low bankruptcy cost.
The core prediction of the model is that the fear of preemption has different implications
depending on the negotiation process between the acquirer and the target firm. In the case
of a merger agreement, the fear of preemption can erode option value and force the merger
timing to converge to the break-even threshold. In the case of a hostile takeover, however, the
fear of preemption erodes the acquirer’s option, and the timing of the acquisition converges
to the global optimizer first-best merger threshold. The intuition behind this prediction is
that if the target firm acts as a Stackelberg leader and decides on the terms first, it can
preserve the value of the option to wait and obtain an efficient share in synergies.
To address these research questions, I develop a model framed within the real options
literature, where firms make investment and financing decisions. These techniques are key
to my results because they allow me to model the dynamic development of a target firm
that is initially financed by equity and has an investment option. The target firm’s profits
are subject to corporate taxes, which provides an incentive to finance the cost of investment
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using debt due to tax shield benefits. However, debt issuance for the target firm is costly,
and the firm must pay a proportional issuance cost. This in turn affects the optimal capital
structure and investment.
The acquirer has an option to buy the target firm and both firms can obtain financial
synergies when the acquirer facilitates access to financing for the target and changes its
optimal capital structure. The acquirer can thus exercise its option to buy the target firm
either before or after the investment exercise threshold. Note that, in my model, the acquirer
is a financially unconstrained firm that can raise financing costlessly, as in McDonald and
Siegel (1986).
The acquirer’s decision is subject to the underlying diffusion process that is the cash flow
risk. The target firm delays the investment exercise if issuing financing is costly. The acquirer
can take over the target firm and provide cheap financing. The acquirer also faces a risk of
preemption from other bidders, which is modelled as a jump process. The decision about
whether to acquire the target firm as a growth option or as assets in place is an outcome
of the financial constraints that bind the target, and of the competition among interested
bidders.
I solve the model using continuous time techniques. First, I solve the investment and
financing problem of the target firm. Second, I solve the optimization problem of the acquirer
as: i) global optimum, ii) merger negotiation, or iii) hostile takeover. I find closed-form
solutions for investment and acquisition thresholds, and determine when the bidder is likely
to acquire growth opportunities or physical assets. If the target firm is financially constrained,
the decision to invest is delayed, which strengthens the incentives of the acquirer to buy the
target firm, and enhances the synergies by providing financing.
Most of the extant M&A literature has focused on operational or financial synergies when
firms combine their assets in place (e.g., Lambrecht (2004); Leland (2007); and Malenko
and Malenko (2015)). Yet, none of the previous papers analysed the acquirer decision as
a sequential option under the threat of preemption. This paper proposes a model, where
synergies arise due to asymmetric access to financing and aims to complement the existing
literature by analysing the effects of acquiring growth options or assets in place in competitive
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environment.
The model contributes to the previous literature in several ways. First, the model is
related to the literature on merger and acquisition decisions within a real options framework
as it studies the timing of buyout decision motivated by asymmetric access to financing
when the acquirer can buy growth options or assets in place. The existing literature solves
for the optimal timing only if firms acquire assets in place. For example, Lambrecht (2004),
Lambrecht and Myers (2007), and Bernile, Lyandres, and Zhdanov (2011) study the terms
and timing of mergers and acquisitions that are motivated by operational synergies and
strategic reasons when two firms combine assets in place. Morellec and Zhdanov (2008)
highlight the strategic role of debt in the bidding process. Hege and Hennessy (2010) present
an analysis where the level of debt plays a strategic role in benefiting from a larger merger
share.
Second, the paper contributes to the literature that analyses the effects of competition on
investment decisions. Previous literature shows that firms do not take investment decisions
in isolation and competition affects the terms and timing of corporate investment.3 For
example, Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) show that the competition for the target firm speeds
up the takeover process, and erodes the ownership stake of bidding shareholders. Calcagno
and Falconieri (2014) study the impact of competition on the outcomes of takeovers. Also
many empirical studies highlight the importance of competition among acquirers.4 Yet, none
of the previous papers analyses how competition affects the timing of the different offer type
and its efficiency. I contribute to the previous literature by analysing the effect of competition
when the transaction is structured as friendly merger or hostile takeover.
Third, the model is related to the literature on financial synergies of mergers and acqui-
sitions. Financial synergies arise when changes in the scope of the firm affect the optimal
3For example, Hackbarth and Miao (2012), Hackbarth, Mathews, and Robinson (2014), Bustamante
(2015), Bustamante and Donangelo (2017)
4Ruback (1983) is an early example of empirical studies that examine the presence of competition in the
acquisitions market by looking at returns. Boone and Mulherin (2007b), Boone and Mulherin (2007a) and
Boone and Mulherin (2009) are among the first studies that provide comprehensive evidence of competition in
the takeovers market. Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010) show that the probability that rival bidders appearing
affects the negotiation process and reduces the bid premium.
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capital structure (Lewellen (1971); Stapleton (1982)). This paper shares some features with
Leland (2007), who derives a model where only financial synergies motivate merger deci-
sions. In contrast to previous literature, I contribute by analysing synergies that arise due
to asymmetric financing.
Finally, the paper is also related to the literature on buyout transactions. Marquez,
Nanda, and Yavuz (2014) discuss the matching between limited and general partners in pri-
vate equity setting. Humphery-Jenner (2012) explains the size effects observed in private
equity. Margsiri, Mello, and Ruckes (2008) show that acquisitions may be an important
outside option as opposed to internal growth. Furthermore, Malenko and Malenko (2015)
show that operational and financial sources of value creation in leveraged buyouts are com-
plements. I contribute to the extant literature by showing that the contradictory prediction
for the effects of competition on the deal efficiency might be explained by the effect of fear
of preemption on different offer type.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an outline and my
model’s assumptions. Section 3 presents closed-form valuation formulas and the investment
threshold when it is costly to issue financing. Section 4 presents a discussion of the financial
synergies of buyout, and the optimal timing of the global optimizer. Section 5 analyses the
effects of preemption fears on the decision terms and timing, while section 6 explores the
decision to acquire either growth options or assets in place, and includes numerical examples.
Section 7 discusses premiums. Section 8 concludes.
2. Model and assumptions
Acquirers i.e. financial intermediaries are defined as firms without any internal growth po-
tential, but with the ability to finance projects at low cost. The acquirer’s growth strategy is
to buy unexercised production opportunities or assets in place of other firms. The acquirer
acts as in McDonald and Siegel (1986) setting, and can raise funds costlessly. It is, however,
subject to the fear of preemption. Competitors that have the same strategy to acquire lucra-
tive investment opportunities can arrive randomly, with intensity δ (the fear of preemption
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as in Hackbarth, Mathews, and Robinson (2014) and Morellec, Valta, and Zhdanov (2014)).
The target has a production opportunity that is associated with sunk cost κ. The target
is subject to underinvestment because of the high cost of issuing financing to cover the
capital outlay.5 It can either issue debt or equity to finance its project, and it must pay the
proportional issuance cost (ιd or ιe). However, a high issuance cost may delay the investment
exercise. In that case, the target firm can be acquired by another company that facilitates
access to cheap financing. The acquirer can either propose a merger agreement or make a
hostile offer to the target shareholders. The acquirer can buy the firm as a growth option
when the optimal acquisition threshold is lower than the investment trigger of the financially
constrained target firm. Otherwise, the bidder can buy the target firm after the production
opportunity is commercialized.
Investors can borrow and lend at the risk-free interest rate (r). Managerial incentives
are aligned with maximizing the wealth of equityholders. Investment irreversibility implies
that, once exercised, the decision cannot be costlessly reversed. Assets in place and growth
options are subject to the same source of uncertainty xt, which follows a geometric Brownian
motion:
dxt = µxtdt+ σxtdWt (1)
where µ < r is a deterministic drift, σ > 0 is volatility, and dWt is the standard Brownian
motion process.
Note further that taxes can affect a firm’s capital structure. The optimal coupon is chosen
to balance the tax advantage of debt with expected bankruptcy costs. When the firm has
debt in place, the default threshold is chosen endogenously by equityholders.
5The finance literature offers some explanations for why firms may forgo positive NPV investment op-
portunities and underinvest: financial constraints ( Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Boyle and
Guthrie (2003)) and debt overhang (a conflict between shareholders and debtholders as part of the project’s
NPV financed with equity is captured by debtholders when debt is risky), as in Myers (1977).
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3. Investment when financing is costly
To determine the optimal investment threshold of the target firm, I solve the game backward,
as follows. First, I solve for post-investment values when it is costly to issue debt or equity.
Second, I derive closed-form solutions for the optimal investment threshold.
3.1 Value of the firm after investment
Before the firm exercises its production opportunity, its shareholders receive capital gains
over each time interval.6 Throughout the paper, I denote the equity value of the innovative
firm before investment as VI,j , and the post-investment values of debt, equity, and firm value
as B+I,j, E
+
I,j , and V
+
I,j , where j stands for the type of growth option financing, which is either
equity (E) or debt (D).
When the growth option is exercised by issuing equity at a cost of ιe, the firm starts to
generate after-tax cash flows of (1 − τ)pixt at each instant of time. The unlevered value of
the firm after investment exercise is therefore:
V +I,E(x) = E
+
I,E(x) =
(1− τ)pix
r − µ
(2)
The value of the equity after the firm exercises the growth option at cost κ is the dis-
counted present value of cash flows (1 − τ)pixt. We can interpret µ as the cash flow growth
rate from the Gordon growth model. The issuance cost of equity (ιe) does not affect the
post-investment equity value, because it is a sunk cost paid at the time of investment.
The target firm can also issue risky debt to cover the investment cost (κ) and pay the
proportional issuance cost of debt (ιd). After the investment option is exercised, the cash
flows and tax benefits accrue until default. But debt is risky, so equityholders are left with
nothing at liquidation. However, bondholders are entitled to scrap value of the firm’s assets
left at default, which I represent as (1 − ϕ)φxI,D/(r − µ), assuming φ < (1 − τ)pi, where
φxt
r−µ
is the first-best firm value when the firm is liquidated, ϕ is the decrease in firm assets
6I assume that the firm issued equity in order to expand its operations. It can thus finance the development
of the production opportunity, which is not yet generating any cash flows.
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at bankruptcy, and ϕ ∈ (0, 1). When ϕ = 0, debtholders can recover the firm assets at
bankruptcy.When ϕ = 1, the investment cannot be reversed costlessly.
Note that xI,D is the default threshold selected by equityholders. The coupon cI,D(x, ιd)
maximizes the firm value net of the issuance cost of debt after the investment exercise, which
is shown by: V +I,D(x, ιd)− ιdB
+
I,D(x, ιd). Using standard techniques, I calculate claims values
and an optimal closure threshold. I present the results in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The optimal equityholders’ closure threshold is:
xI,D =
λ
(λ− 1)
(r − µ)
r
cI,D(x, ιd)
pi
(3)
where λ is a negative root of the quadratic equation 1/2σ2z(z− 1)+µz− r = 0. The optimal
coupon maximizing firm value is:
cI,D(x, ιd) = xpiΩ
1/λ r
r − µ
λ− 1
λ
(4)
where , and given that τ > ιd:
Ω = 1− λ
(1− ιd)(pi − (1− ϕ)φ)
pi(τ − ιd)
(5)
Firm value when financing is costly (ιd > 0) is:
V +I,D(x, ιd) = xΨ (6)
where Ψ =
[
pi
(
1− τ + (τ − ιd)Ω
1/λ
)]
/(r−µ). Firm value when financing is costless (ιd = 0)
is:
V +I,D(x, 0) = xΦ (7)
where Φ = Ψ(ιd = 0)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The issuance cost of debt imposes financial frictions on the target firm. When a firm uses
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debt to finance investment, the proportional issuance cost (ιd) decreases the coupon that
the firm can issue, which is lower than the first-best coupon cI,D(x, ιd) < cI,D(x, 0). This in
turn lowers the value of the firm after investment exercise, and V +I,D(x, ιd) < V
+
I,D(x, 0). the
higher the issuance cost of debt, the more severe the target firm’s underinvestment problem.
However, the presence of an external investor who can provide access to cheap financing can
alleviate this problem.
3.2 Optimal investment exercise and financing terms
Before exercising an investment, the target firm decides on the timing and the financing
strategy. When equity is issued, firm value is affected by the proportional sunk issuance cost
at the time of investment. When debt is issued, the issuance cost affects the coupon as well
as the post-investment firm value. Thus, the form of financing affects both the investment
surplus and the optimal investment exercise.
Prior to the investment exercise, the shareholders of the target firm obtain capital gains
E[dVI,j(x)] over each time interval dt, because the firm is not yet generating cash flows. I solve
this problem by using a standard ordinary differential equation (ODE) subject to boundary
conditions. The solution is discussed in more detail in Appendix B and provides the following
results:
Lemma 2 The investment threshold of the target firm when the investment is financed with
equity is:
xcI(ιe > 0) =
β
β − 1
(r − µ)κ
(1− ιe)(1− τ)pi
(8)
The investment threshold of the target firm when the investment is financed with debt is:
xcI(ιd > 0) =
β
β − 1
(r − µ)κ
(1− τ + (τ − ιd)Ω1/λ)pi
(9)
where β is a positive root of the quadratic equation 1/2σ2z(z − 1) + µz − r = 0. When the
investment is financed with equity, the value of the target firm over the continuation interval
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x < xI,j is:
VI,E(x, ιe) = x
β κ
β − 1
[
β − 1
β
(1− τ)(1− ιe)pi
(r − µ)κ
]β
(10)
When the investment is financed with debt, it is:
VI,D(x, ιd) = x
β κ
β − 1
[
β − 1
β
Ψ
κ
]β
(11)
For investments financed with debt, we can rewrite the above equations as the value of the
growth option and the future tax shield: VI,D(x, ιd) = GO(x, ιd)+FTS(x, ιd), where the value
of the growth option is:
GO(x, ιd) =
[
(1− τ)pix
r − µ
− κ
](
x
xI,D
)β
(12)
and the value of the future tax shield is:
FTS(x, ιd) =
[
pix(τ − ιd)(Ω)
1/λ
r − µ
](
x
xI,D
)β
(13)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 2 provides a closed-form solution for the optimal investment exercise threshold
when the cost of investment is financed by issuing equity or raising risky debt. Comparative
statics illustrate the standard predictions of the real options literature. Note that the invest-
ment threshold is delayed when the cost of investment (κ) increases, or when the size of the
growth option (pi) decreases. Higher corporate taxes also delay investment. Although there
is an increase in the tax shield when the corporate tax rate (τ) increases, this effect is offset
by a decrease in the present value of after-tax cash flows. Uncertainty (σ) can further delay
investment exercise due to the value of waiting.
Consider a case when the target firm chooses to finance investment costs with equity. It
would thus not benefit from the tax shield related to debt. I show that, if an investment
is financed with debt, the value of the firm is the sum of the value of the growth option
and the discounted value of the tax shield that begins accruing after the investment option
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is exercised. I also demonstrate how firm value can be destroyed by using a suboptimal
financial structure, as in the following equation.
VI,E(x, ιe)
VI,D(x, ιd)
=
(
(1− ιe)(1− τ)
1− τ + (τ − ιd)Ω1/λ
)β
< 1 (14)
If the investment is financed with debt, the value of the firm is comprised not only of the
growth option, but also of the net present value of future tax benefits. Higher future cash
flows speed up the investment threshold, therefore: xI,D < xI,E. This effect is consistent with
the accelerated investment effect of Lyandres and Zhdanov (2010). They show that, when
shareholders have no incentive to underinvest due to wealth transfers related to the presence
of debt (the standard debt overhang problem of Myers (1977)), they will instead speed up
investment.
4. Buyout investment and optimal timing
In this section I present an alternative form of financing which is provided to the target firm
by an external investor who can raise funds costlessly. I assume that the external investor
provides debt financing, because the cost of issuing debt is lower than the cost of issuing
equity.
I define the external investor as a firm whose growth strategy is to acquire production
opportunities or assets of other firms. Most of its acquisition deals are subsidiary mergers.
The acquirer creates a shell subsidiary, whose stock is then used to acquire the stock of the
target company.Gaughan (2011) The acquirer thus acts as a shell company and can finance
the target firm as a separate project.
The investment problem of the acquiring firm is a two-stage project. The bidder has an
option to acquire the target firm, which is worth OM(x). In the first stage, the acquirer
buys the target at an optimal merger threshold xM , and pays the sunk cost of KM to cover
restructuring costs. In addition, the target firm pays KT , which is the sunk cost associated
with the transaction processing. In the second stage, the growth option is exercised at an
optimal first-best investment threshold xoI(ιd = 0) at a sunk cost κ, provided the acquisition
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takes place before the investment exercise threshold of the financially constrained target firm
xcI(ιd > 0).
The acquirer can buy the target firm as a growth option, and keep the investment 1)
unexercised (if xM < x
o
I), 2) as a growth option with immediate investment exercise (if
xoI ≤ xM < x
c
I ), or 3) as assets in place (if x
c
I ≤ xM).
In each region, the synergies created depend on the target firm’s phase of development.
In the subsequent subsection, I decompose these synergies. I then determine the first-best
merger threshold from which I can capture the dynamic aspects of the acquirer’s decision.
4.1 Decomposition of synergies
An acquisition can change the value of the target firm by relaxing financial constraints. In
this paper, I disregard synergies that result from revenue increases or cost efficiencies. If they
exist, they will be supplementary to the synergies that I analyse. I focus solely on synergies
created by facilitating the target firm’s access to financing.
I define the option to invest OI(x, 0) as a production opportunity when financing is
raised costlessly, as in McDonald and Siegel (1986), and OI(x, ιd) when it is costly. The total
synergies that accrue to the acquirer, denoted as ∆(x, ιd), are the difference between the two
options’ values OI(x, 0) and OI(x, ιd). I can therefore define total synergies as follows:
∆(x, ιd) = OI(x, 0)−OI(x, ιd) (15)
where:
OI(x, 0) =


VI,j(x, 0) x < x
o
I
V +I,j(x, 0) x ≥ x
o
I
;
OI(x, ιd) =


VI,j(x, ιd) x < x
c
I
V +I,j(x, ιd) x ≥ x
c
I
The acquirer compares the value of the target under each scenario. The characteristics of
the total synergies depend on whether the acquirer buys the target firm as a growth option
or as assets in place.
13
To isolate the effects of alterations in company ownership, I separate total synergies into
three groups: the limited liability effect, the leverage effect, and the asymmetric financing
effect. For the first two effects, I follow Leland (2007), and identify the synergies that arise
due to the limited liability (LL) and leverage effect (LE). LL is associated with changes in
the value of the option to abandon the firm if cash flows fall below the critical level. LE is
associated with changes in the value of the tax shield (TS) and default costs (DC).
The asymmetric financing (AF) effect arises when the target firm is in an early stage of
development and is subject to financial constraints. The acquirer provides access to cheaper
financing, thus ensuring that the option to invest is exercised effectively. The acquirer does
not have an option to refinance the debt of the target firm after the investment exercise.
Total synergies can be decomposed as follows:
∆(x, ιd) = LL(x, ιd) + TS(x, ιd) +DC(x, ιd) + AF (x, ιd) (16)
However, I show here only the incremental effects of synergies on the acquirer’s value. I anal-
yse total synergies over three regions when it is optimal to acquire the target firm depending
on its development stage.
If xM < x
o
I , the target firm is a form of a growth option. The acquirer compares the value
of the target firm under both costless (VI,D(x, 0)) and costly financing (VI,D(x, ιd)). Gains
in this region are associated with undervalued growth options and the future tax shield.
Synergies depend on AF and LE. LL is not relevant here.
Total synergies are decomposed into:
∆(xM < x
o
I) =
{[
(1− τ)pix
r − µ
− κ
](
x
xI,D(x, 0)
)β
−
[
(1− τ)pix
r − µ
− κ
](
x
xI,D(x, ιd)
)β}
+
{[
pix(τ)(Ω(0))1/λ
r − µ
](
x
xI,D(x, 0)
)β
−
[
pix(τ − ιd)(Ω(ιd))
1/λ
r − µ
](
x
xI,D(x, ιd)
)β}
The first term is related to AF. It shows the change in value of the growth option due to
the facilitated access to financing provided by the acquirer. AF is positive as long as the
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discrepancy in financing access prevails.
The second term, TS, shows the change in future tax benefits if the firm issues debt to
finance the growth option. These synergies are always positive if there is a wedge between
the cost of financing for the target and for the bidder.
If xoI ≤ xM < x
c
I , the acquirer buys the target firm as a growth option, and immediately
exercises the investment. However, this occurs later than the first-best investment trigger.
The acquirer compares the target firm value that accrues at optimal investment exercise
V +I,D(x, 0) versus the when financing is costly VI,D(x, ιd). I decompose total synergies into:
∆(xoI ≤ xM < x
c
I) =
{
(1− τ)pix
r − µ
− κ−
[
(1− τ)pix
r − µ
− κ
](
x
xcI,D(x, ιd)
)β}
+
{
τcI,D(0)
r
−
[
pix(τ − ιd)(Ω(ιd))
1/λ
r − µ
](
x
xI,D(ιd)
)β}
+
{(
(1− ϕ)φxI,D(0)
r − µ
−
cI,D(0)
r
)(
x
xI,D(0)
)λ
− 0
}
+
{
(1− τ)
[
cI,D
r
−
pixI,D(0)
r − µ
](
x
xI,D(0)
)λ
− 0
}
The first term defines the synergies from AF. The acquirer compares the value of the
optimally exercised option with the value of the option when managed by the financially
constrained firm. It is positive because the probability of option exercise by the financially
constrained firm is lower than one over this region,
(
x/xcI,D(x, ιd)
)β
< 1. The next terms
show LE, the positive effect of TS, and the negative effect of DC. The last effect is the positive
contribution of the value of LL.
If xcI ≤ xM , the acquirer buys the target firm as assets in place. The acquirer compares the
value of the target firm after investment exercise V +I,D(x, 0) and the value of the financially
constrained target firm V +I,D(x, ιd). The ex-post investment option exercise synergies are
related to two sources: LE (TS and DC), and LL. I can decompose total synergies into:
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∆(xcI ≤ xM) =
{(
(1− τ)pix
r − µ
−
(1− τ)pix
r − µ
)
+
(
τcI,D(0)
r
−
τcI,D(ιd)
r
)}
+
{[
(1− ϕ)φxI,D(0)
r − µ
−
cI,D(0)
r
](
x
xI,D(0)
)λ
−
[
(1− ϕ)φxI,D(ιd)
r − µ
−
cI,D(ιd)
r
](
x
xI,D(ιd)
)λ}
+
{
(1− τ)
[
cI,D(0)
r
−
pixI,D(x, 0)
r − µ
](
x
xI,D(0)
)λ
− (1− τ)
[
cI,D(ιd)
r
−
pixI,D(ιd)
r − µ
](
x
xI,D(ιd)
)λ}
The first term shows the change from the AF effect. When the assets in place are installed,
the effect of the efficient investment exercise disappears. Positive synergies, when the target
firm is under the management of the acquirer, may only be created when assets generate
synergistic cash flows. The second term shows a change in synergies due to TS. I predict this
effect to be positive as cI,D(0) > cI,D(ιd). The third term is associated with DC. Consistent
with Leland (2007), the incremental effect on synergies is negative. A higher coupon in
the absence of operational synergies increases the probability of default and decreases the
bankruptcy value. Note that I make no assumptions about any correlations between the
assets of the acquirer and those of the target. However, as per Lewellen (1971), if the assets
of two firms are imperfectly correlated, the portfolio combining them can actually reduce the
risk of the merged firm. The last term is the incremental effect on the combined value of the
firm due to LL on the synergies.
4.2 Merger surplus and globally optimal timing
The acquirer facilitates the access to financing for the target firm. Therefore, the value of
the option to invest for the acquirer is OI(x, 0), given financing is raised costlessly. If it
raises costly financing, then the acquirer must pay the stand-alone value of the target firm
OI(x, ιd). The benefit of combining the two firms together equals the difference between the
value of the target firm with the different cost of issuing the financing. If the cost of financing
for the target firm is higher than that for the acquirer, the benefit is positive. Both firms
must cover the costs of merging, which for the bidder is KM , and for the target is KT . If
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we define the combined benefit from merging from a global optimizer perspective, we get:
∆(x, ιd)−KM −KT , which is positive given ιd > 0. A merger is considered if the stochastic
synergies are higher than the cost of merging. Note further that the benefit from merging
appreciates if x increases. Therefore, in the option vernacular, the payoff resembles a call
option characteristics, and is given as:
S(x, ιd) = maxx[∆(x, ιd)−KM −KT , 0] (17)
The firm can exercise the option to merge at an optimal threshold xM , and either receive the
net synergies or leave the option unexercised. I denote the value of the option as OM and it is
the solution to an ordinary differential equation (ODE). This equation can be solved subject
to boundary conditions. The value-matching condition stipulates that, at the threshold, the
synergies realized are equal to the option value. We thus have:
OM(xM , xM) = ∆(xM , ιd)−KM −KT (18)
The resulting value of the merger option over the continuation region (prior to exercise) is:
OM(x, xM) = (∆(xM , ιd)−KM −KT )
(
x
xM
)β
(19)
From a global optimizer viewpoint, the merger decision is made in isolation. However, the
timing and terms of the decision depend on the investment and financing policy of the target
firm. The goal is to facilitate the flow of financing and reduce underinvestment. It is therefore
optimal to exercise the option to merge if the state variable x exceeds the merger threshold
(xM). The merger threshold is the solution to the optimality (first-order) condition:
∂OM(x, xM)
∂xM
= 0 (20)
Optimizing the merger option with respect to xM results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The first-best merger threshold of a global optimizer is defined as follows. If
KM+KT
κ
< Φ
β−Ψβ
βΦβ
, the target firm is acquired as a growth option (i.e., xM < x
o
I < x
c
I), and
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the merger threshold is:
xM = Hβκ
[
β(KM +KT )
κ(Φβ −Ψβ)
] 1
β
(21)
If Φ
β−Ψβ
βΦβ
≤ KM+KT
κ
< Φ−Ψ
Ψ
, the target firm is acquired as a growth option, which is imme-
diately exercised (i.e., xoI <xM ≤ x
c
I). The merger threshold is a solution to the following
equation:
xMΦ− x
β
M
κ
β − 1
(
Ψ
κHβ
)β
−Hβ(KM +KT ) = 0 (22)
If Φ−Ψ
Ψ
≤ KM+KT
κ
, the target firm is acquired as assets in place (i.e., xoI < x
c
I ≤ xM), and the
merger threshold is:
xM = Hβ
KM +KT
Φ−Ψ
(23)
where Hβ = β/(β − 1), and β > 1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation 1/2σ
2z(z −
1) + µz − r = 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.
It is important to note that the merger option can be exercised before the investment
option. This explanation is based on the following arguments. If xM < x
o
I , the acquirer com-
pares the value of two unexercised options. In contrast to a standard sequential investment
model, the overall effect of the cost of investment (κ) on the merger threshold is 1− 1
β
. Thus,
κ has two opposing effects on the merger threshold: i) the standard effect, which delays the
exercise trigger, and ii) an acceleration of the merger exercise as it contributes to the syner-
gies’ benefits (a higher κ implies a larger magnitude of merger synergies). Therefore, if the
investment cost is relatively high, and the following condition is satisfied KM+KT
κ
< Φ
β−Ψβ
βΦβ
,
the merger can occur earlier than the investment threshold.
This proposition shows the importance of the form of the target firm’s assets to the bid-
der’s acquisition strategy. Depending on whether the acquirer is buying the target firm as
a growth option or as assets in place, the optimal first-best merger is exercised at different
triggers. Moreover, acquiring the target firm as a growth option, before the optimal invest-
ment exercise, is associated with high uncertainty over future synergies. This is reflected by
additional factor β.
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The higher the uncertainty the higher the realized synergies (Φβ −Ψβ(− 1/β) are. Given
the target is acquired as a growth option its value increases as the uncertainty of the under-
lying asset increases.
It is therefore optimal to acquire a firm at an earlier stage of development for a lower
level of volatility. An increase in volatility limits the region over which the acquirer decides
to buy the target firm as a growth option, because (Φβ − Ψβ)/βΦβ decreases if σ increases.
All else equal, acquiring growth options becomes unlikely.
The merger threshold, conditional on acquiring the target firm as assets in place, has a
standard form, which is well-known in the real options literature. It depends on the sunk
transaction cost and the synergies that can be realized upon exercising. The merger threshold
is delayed if uncertainty increases due to a hysteresis factor Hβ, which reflects the value of
an option to wait.
5. The fear of preemption and acquisition terms and timing
Recent empirical literature suggests there is strong competition among bidders. Boone and
Mulherin (2007a) and Boone and Mulherin (2007b) claim that half the takeover deals in their
sample are subject to competition from other public or private bidders. Moreover, friendly
mergers in a form of negotiation are not free from competition either. Aktas, de Bodt, and
Roll (2010) provide evidence of latent competition (the likelihood that rival bidders could
appear). This gives rise to the fear of preemption in the case of a merger agreement which
can be explained by a fiduciary out clause included in the contract that gives the target the
right to terminate the agreement if a better deal appears before the target board gives its
full approval.
Therefore, based on this compelling evidence, I introduce competition into the model in
the form of the fear of preemption. I assume the bidder that enters the negotiation process or
makes a tender offer may be subject to preemption risk (δ) due to an arrival of a competing
bidder. The fear of preemption is modelled as a jump in the value of the claim at the time
the option to buy the target expires, with the probability of preemption per unit of time δdt.
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This is reflected in an ODE by an additional term that changes firm value.
The form of an offer is an important element of my analysis, because it can fundamentally
change the timing of a merger and how the synergies are shared between firms. Lambrecht
(2003) shows that the negotiation game affects the terms and timing of mergers motivated
by economies of scale. I follow his setting, and next compare friendly mergers and hostile
takeovers.
Boone and Mulherin (2007b) unravel that there exists quite active market even before the
firm is sold and the transaction is publicly announced. They show that many firms are sold
in a negotiated process between the target firm and one or multiple bidders. One example of
a friendly merger is Boone and Mulherin (2007b), p.849: ”BankBoston provides an example
of a negotiation. On April 1, 1998, the CEO of BankBoston met with the CEO of Fleet
Financial to discuss a possible merger. During subsequent extended, private discussions,
BankBoston did not contact any other potential bidders. The merger agreement was signed
on March 14, 1999 and was publicly announced the following day. The merger was completed
on October 1, 1999.”
Therefore, I define friendly mergers as deals that can be initiated by either the bidder or
the target firm and the terms and timing are negotiated simultaneously. In contrast, hostile
takeovers are the deals that can only be initiated by the acquirer who publicly contacts
target’s shareholders.
More formally during the merger negotiation process, each firm possesses an option on the
fraction of merger synergies. The acquirer obtains a share sB of the new entity, and the target
firm obtains a share sT . I assume that, at the time of acquisition, the entire merger surplus
is shared between two firms, thus, sB + sT = 1. And I define the benefit from exercising a
merger option that accrues to the acquirer and the target as follows. The bidder’s surplus is
equal to a share sB in the new entity, which can now raise the funds costlessly less the fixed
acquisition costs, KM , which are: sBOI(x, 0)−KM . The target exchanges its firm value when
financing is costly into a share in the new entity when financing is costless, less the fixed
acquisition costs KT , and its benefit is: sTOI(x, 0)−OI(x, ιd)−KT . Each firm will exercise
its option only if the stochastic benefit is higher than the merger cost. Otherwise, they leave
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the option unexercised. This type of payoff structure has a call option characteristic that
ensures the existence of an optimal exercise threshold for each firm, the bidder, and the
target. Over the continuation region, the value of the option satisfies an ODE solved subject
to boundary conditions.
The next subsections analyse how the terms and timing of the merger depend on the
form of the acquisition. A friendly merger agreement refers to a negotiated deal; a hostile
takeover, in a form of a tender offer, usually means that one firm makes an offer directly to
shareholders to sell their shares at specified prices.Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin (2004)
5.1 Friendly mergers
I analyse a friendly merger in the form of an agreement where firms negotiate how to divide
the surplus. The payoff for both firms is uncertain, and is contingent on the future realization
of merger synergies. Firms have an interest in maximizing these synergies, and in exercising
their options at an optimal threshold. The bidder and the target negotiate the terms and
the timing of the merger simultaneously.
At the optimal merger threshold, each firm compares the value of the merger option,
OMB(x) for the bidder and OMT (x) for the target, with the payoff realized at the optimal
exercise threshold. The value of the merger option for the bidder is:
OMB(x, xM(sB), ιd) = (sBOI(xM(sB), 0)−KM)
(
x
xM(sB)
)ξ
(24)
where xM(sB) is the reaction function of the bidder dependent on the share sB. For the
target, the value of the option is:
OMT (x, xM(sT ), ιd) = (sTOI(xM(sT ), 0)−OI(xM(sT ), ιd)−KT )
(
x
xM(sT )
)β
(25)
where xM(sT ) is the reaction function of the target dependent on the share sT .
Eqs. (24) and (25) show the discounted value of the synergies that accrue to each company.
In the presence of competition, the discount factor of the bidder (x/xM)
ξ is higher than the
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discount factor of the target (x/xM)
β. The bidder, subject to preemption, becomes impatient
and discounts its payoff at a higher hurdle rate.
Subsequently, from Eq. (24) and Eq. (25), I calculate the reaction function of the bidder
xM(sB) and the target xM(sT ). A friendly merger is executed when xM(sB) = xM(sT ), and
surplus is divided according to the unique sharing rule (sB, sT ). I derive the optimal merger
threshold for the regions discussed in Section 4. The results are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 The exercise trigger of a merger agreement, modelled as a Cournot negotia-
tion game, where the target and the acquirer decide on the terms and timing simultaneously,
is defined as follows. If
(Hξ/Hβ)KM+KT
κ
< Φ
β−Ψβ
βΦβ
, the target firm is acquired as a growth option
(i.e., xM < x
o
I < x
c
I), and the merger threshold is:
xM = Hβκ

β(HξHβKM +KT )
κ(Φβ −Ψβ)


1
β
(26)
If Φ
β−Ψβ
βΦβ
≤
(Hξ/Hβ)KM+KT
κ
< Φ−Ψ
Ψ
, the target firm is acquired as a growth option, which
is exercised immediately (i.e., xoI <xM < x
c
I). The merger threshold is a solution to the
following equation:
xMΦ− x
β
M
κ
β − 1
(
Ψ
κHβ
)β
−Hβ(
Hξ
Hβ
KM +KT ) = 0 (27)
If Φ−Ψ
Ψ
≤
(Hξ/Hβ)KM+KT
κ
, the target firm is acquired as assets in place (i.e., xoI < x
c
I < xM),
and the merger threshold is:
xM = Hβ
Hξ
Hβ
KM +KT
Φ−Ψ
(28)
where Hξ = ξ/(ξ−1) and ξ > 1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation 1/2σ
2z(z−1)+
µz − r − δ = 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.
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The fear of preemption speeds up the acquirer’s exercise trigger. This is reflected by the
additional factor Hξ/Hβ, which decreases the acquirer’s costs KM . It also suggests that the
acquirer accepts lower or even negative NPV projects in order to preempt competition.
If there is no fear of preemption and δ = 0, expressions from Proposition 2 coincide with
the first-best merger threshold as defined in Proposition 1. It is then optimal to merge at
the first-best threshold xM(δ = 0), and the target firm obtains a share in the new entity
equal to sT (δ = 0). However, if the fear of preemption increases, the bidder is willing to
offer a higher share in the new entity to the target firm: sT (δ > 0) > sT (δ = 0). Firms
merge at a different threshold xM(δ > 0), which is lower than the first-best merger threshold.
The fear of preemption changes both the terms and the timing of the acquisition. These are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If the bidder is subject to the fear of preemption, an acquisition that is an
outcome of a merger agreement occurs earlier than the first-best merger threshold, and the
target firm obtains a higher ownership share.
5.2 Hostile takeover
In contrast to friendly mergers, where terms and timing are negotiated simultaneously, during
the hostile takeover the target dictates the terms and the acquirer subsequently decides on the
timing. I model the hostile takeover as a Stackelberg game, where the target firm determines
the share (sT ), and the acquirer decides subsequently on the optimal merger exercise (xM).
The bidder firm and the target firm both have takeover options, denoted by OTB(x) and
OTT (x), respectively. I show that the value of the option for the bidder is:
OTB(x, xM(sB)) = (sBOI(xM(sB), 0)−KM)
(
x
xM(sB)
)ξ
(29)
while for the target it is:
OTT (x, sT (xM), sT )) = (sT (xM)OI(xM , 0)−OI(xM , ιd)−KT )
(
x
xM
)β
(30)
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The fear of preemption faced by the bidder is reflected in the discounting factor (x/xM(sB))
ξ.
I solve the game by backward induction. First, the acquirer chooses the timing of the acqui-
sition, xM , given share sB, by maximizing its option:
max
x
OTB(x, xM , sB) (31)
Second, the target firm maximizes its option:
max
sT
OTT (x, xM(sT ), sT ) (32)
The optimal takeover threshold is derived for the regions discussed in Section 4.. The results
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 I define the exercise trigger of a hostile takeover, modelled as a Stackelberg
game, where the target firm decides on the terms and the acquirer subsequently decides on
the timing, as follows. If
HξKM+KT
κ
< Φ
β−Ψβ
βΦβ
, the target firm is acquired as a growth option
(i.e., xM < x
o
I < x
c
I), and the merger threshold is:
xM = Hβκ
[
β(HξKM +KT )
κ(Φβ −Ψβ)
] 1
β
(33)
If Φ
β−Ψβ
βΦβ
≤
HξKM+KT
κ
< Φ−Ψ
Ψ
, the target firm is acquired as a growth option, which is exercised
immediately (i.e., xoI <xM < x
c
I). The merger threshold is a solution to the following equation:
xMΦ− x
β
M
κ
β − 1
[
Ψ
Hβκ
]β
−Hβ(HξKM +KT ) = 0 (34)
If Φ−Ψ
Ψ
≤
HξKM+KT
κ
, the target firm is acquired as assets in place (i.e., xoI < x
c
I < xM), and
the merger threshold is:
xM = Hβ
HξKM +KT
Φ−Ψ
(35)
In contrast to friendly mergers, hostile takeovers are associated with a delay due to
increased costs. This is reflected by a premium, paid by the acquirer, in the form of an
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additional hysteresis factor (Hξ). Thus, the acquisition costs of the acquirer are increased.
In the absence of a fear of preemption, when δ = 0, implying that Hξ = Hβ, hostile takeovers
are exercised later than the first-best threshold and later than friendly mergers. This result is
consistent with Lambrecht (2004), where pre-commitment delays the timing of the takeover.
I contribute to this strand of the literature by showing that, when a bidder is subject to
preemption fears, i.e., if δ > 0, implying that Hξ < Hβ, the hostile takeover threshold is
exercised earlier. If δ →∞, implying that Hξ → 1, the takeover is exercised at the optimal
global optimizer merger threshold as defined in Proposition 1. The following proposition
follows.
Proposition 5 When the bidder is subject to preemption fear, mergers are exercised too
early, while takeovers converge to the global optimizer first-best merger threshold.
Proof. See Appendix E.
It is quite intuitive to predict that competition erodes the option value and speeds up the
merger threshold. For example, Morellec and Zhdanov (2005), in their model of takeovers,
demonstrate that competition speeds up timing and increases the target firm’s share. The
analysis suggests that it is important, however, to distinguish how the competition affects
each type of acquisition offer. I show that, with no competition, a friendly merger offer is
the optimal choice that gives the first-best outcome. However, in the presence of an infinite
fear of preemption, the hostile takeover threshold tends to the first-best merger threshold.
I obtain a novel result: The implications of the effect of competition depend on the
negotiation process between the acquirer and the target firm. In the case of a merger agree-
ment, competition erodes the option value, and forces a merger’s timing to converge to the
break-even threshold. However, in the case of a hostile takeover, the timing of an acquisition
converges to the first-best merger threshold (the global optimizer merger threshold). The
intuition here is that, if the target firm acts as a Stackelberg leader, it preserves the option
value and obtains an efficient share. Subsequently, the acquirer, fearing preemption decides
on the timing of the acquisition, which converges to the global optimizer first-best merger
threshold.
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6. Model predictions
To better illustrate the results of my study and understand the model’s dynamics, I next
present several numerical examples. Parameter values for each figure are based on estimates
from the corporate finance literature. Volatility is assumed to be at the level of σ = 20%,
which is roughly consistent with volatility estimates from Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008). I
set the growth rate of cash flows to µ = 5%, the risk-free rate to r = 6%, and the corporate
tax rate is τ = 25%. The default cost is based on recent estimates of Glover (2016) and
ϕ = 45%, which imply that approximately 65% of the revenue stream is recovered in the case
of an alternative use of the firm’s assets. The size of the growth option is pi = 10 and the
costs of investment and acquisition exercise are as follows: κ = 140, KM = 10, and KT = 5.
The arrival rate of competitors is set as δ = 1.
6.1 Risk analysis
In this subsection, I present the implications of the parameters that define risk in the model,
uncertainty over future cash flows (σ), and preemption risk (δ). Figure 1 illustrates when it
is optimal to acquire the target firm as a growth option or as assets in place.
I present the solution in the form of a region plot, where ιd is a critical level of switching
between regimes. I define three regions, where it is optimal for the acquirer to buy the target
firm: (i) as assets in place (white region), (ii) as a growth option and immediate exercise (light
shaded region), or (iii) as a growth option and wait to exercise at the optimal investment
threshold (dark shaded region).
Panels A and D define the conditions for the global optimizer merger threshold as defined
in Proposition 1, Panels B and E define the conditions for the friendly merger as defined in
Proposition 2, and Panels C and F define the conditions for the hostile takeover as defined
in Proposition 4.
Panel A shows the global optimizer solution. The first-best solution of the global optimizer
is not affected by the fear of preemption. The critical level of ιd is monotonically increasing
in σ, which means that, at lower levels of volatility, the acquirer is more likely to buy the
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Figure 1: Optimal merger decision and risk analysis (region plot). The dark shaded area depicts when the bidder
acquires the target firm as the growth option, and waits to exercise the investment option at the optimal investment threshold.
The light shaded area depicts when the bidder acquires the target firm as the growth option and immediately exercises the
investment option. The white area depicts when the bidder acquires the target firm as assets in place. I vary cash flow risk (σ),
preemption risk (δ), and the issuance cost of financing (ιd). Panels A and D define the conditions for the global optimizer merger
threshold as defined in Proposition 1. Panels B and E define the conditions for the friendly merger as defined in Proposition 2.
Panels C and F define the conditions for the hostile takeover as defined in Proposition 4.
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target firm as a growth option. The decision is thus not only affected by the uncertainty
surrounding the acquisition, but also by any subsequent uncertainty associated with the
investment option exercise and the synergies that will materialize at that time.
Financial synergies in the case of buying the target firm as a growth option are associated
with greater uncertainty. This is reflected by β in the expression defining synergies from
acquisition Φβ − Ψβ. Note that the latter decreases as σ increases. Therefore, for higher
levels of uncertainty, the acquirer is more likely to buy assets in place that are already
generating profits.
In Panel B, in the case of a solution for the friendly merger offer subject to the fear of
preemption the effect of σ is non-monotonic. To understand this further, I first consider the
optimal policy of the acquirer and the target. As uncertainty increases, it delays merger
and investment exercise because the hysteresis factor Hβ increases. However, in the case
of a friendly merger threshold, as defined in Proposition 2, the cost of the acquisition is
associated with an additional factor, which is a multiple of KM . It depends on hysteresis
factors Hξ/Hβ, and decreases in σ. In the presence of significant competition, the fear of
preemption can erode the value of waiting. The acquirer is then forced to buy the target firm
at the break-even threshold.
In Panel C, in the case of a solution for the hostile takeover offer, the effect of σ on
the critical level of ιd is monotonically increasing. This represents a delay compared to the
friendly merger offer. The delay comes from an additional hysteresis factor Hξ imposed on
the merger cost KM , which increases in σ. This premium may be associated with a higher
entry cost for hostile bidders, because they tend to face more uncertainty than in the case of
a negotiated bid.
The first-best solution of the global optimizer is not affected by preemption. And, in
Panel D, the relationship is constant. However, I show it for comparison with the friendly
merger and hostile takeover offers.
In Panel E, I show that the acquirer is more likely to buy the target firm as a growth
option when the fear of preemption increases. This effect is associated with the erosion of
the option value due to competition.
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In Panel F, I illustrate the effect of the fear of preemption on the hostile takeover offer.
The competition accelerates the optimal exercise. The takeover threshold converges to the
first-best threshold of the global optimizer.
6.2 Capital structure
I next analyse the parameters of primary importance for the capital structure choice of the
target firm in the model: the tax rate (τ), and the bankruptcy cost (ϕ). In Figure 2, I depict
region plots of the decision to acquire the target firm as a growth option or as assets in place.
In Panels A to C, the critical level ιd decreases in τ . This means that the acquirer is
more likely to buy the target firm as a growth option when corporate taxes are higher. In
the model, taxes affect financial synergies. The corporate tax increases the importance of
the future tax shield in the case of acquiring growth options. Thus, higher taxes increase
financial synergies and speed up the exercise decision of the acquirer. Furthermore, when
taxes are high, the reduction in after-tax profit delays the investment decision, which makes
the underinvestment problem of the constrained target firm even more severe. Countries
with high tax rates may want to consider that acquiring a firm as a growth option could be
a solution to relaxing the capital constraints these firms face.
In Panels D to F, the critical level ιd increases with the bankruptcy cost ϕ. Acquiring
the target firm as a growth option is more likely when the target firm has a lower haircut
on its assets. In other words, in the case of default, its assets can be sold or converted into
an alternative use at a relatively low price. The high bankruptcy cost delays the investment
threshold of the constrained target firm. The bankruptcy cost also has an effect on the
acquisition threshold, in the form of increasing the probability of default of the target firm.
This decreases the financial synergies, and delays the exercise trigger of the acquirer.
6.3 Profitability of target firm
I also show how the parameters related to the target firm’s profitability affect the choice
between acquiring the target firm as a growth option or as assets in place. In Figure 3, I
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Figure 2: Optimal merger decision and capital structure (region plot). The dark shaded area depicts when the bidder
acquires the target firm as a growth option, and waits to exercise the investment option at the optimal investment threshold.
The light shaded area depicts when the bidder acquires the target firm as the growth option and immediately exercises the
investment option. The white area depicts when the bidder acquires the target firm as assets in place. I vary the tax rate
(τ), the bankruptcy cost (ϕ), and the issuance cost of financing (ιd). Panels A and D define the conditions for the global
optimizer merger threshold as defined in Proposition 1. Panels B and E define the conditions for the friendly merger as defined
in Proposition 2. Panels C and F define the conditions for the hostile takeover as defined in Proposition 4. The parameters are
set as in the previous figure.
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depict how the growth rate of cash flows (µ) and the size of the growth option (pi) impact
the acquisition decision.
In Panels A to C the critical level ιd decreases in the growth rate of cash flows (µ). A
higher µ increases the value of future cash flows by accelerating the investment decision of
the constrained firm. However, for the acquiring firm, µ increases the financial synergies
of acquiring a growth option, and erodes the effect of uncertainty surrounding the option
exercise in Φβ −Ψβ.
In the case of the first-best and hostile takeover solution (Panels A and C), note that the
increase in financial synergies speeds up the acquisition more when the acquirer buys growth
options and waits to exercise the investment. These two effects are of the same magnitude
when the acquirer buys a growth option with an immediate exercise trigger.
In the case of a friendly merger, µ has an additional effect on cost KM . As µ increases, it
affects the factor Hξ/Hβ, and erodes the effect of uncertainty associated with the acquisition.
This makes acquiring growth options more likely.
In Panels D to F, the critical level ιd increases with the size of the growth option (pi),
which speeds up the investment exercise given that sunk cost κ is fixed. The underinvestment
problem of the target firm is therefore less severe, which in turn lowers the financial synergies
of acquiring growth options. It suggests that smaller firms are more likely to be acquired as
growth options, and larger firms are more likely to be acquired as assets in place.
7. Target premium and acquirer return in friendly mergers and hostile takeovers
7.1 Target premium
The existing literature offers no agreement about how takeover premiums are affected by
competition and by the type of offer. For example, Boone and Mulherin (2007b) suggest
that wealth effects for target shareholders do not differ depending on the form of acquisition.
Mandatory disclosure rules that increase expected competition among bidders may raise
offer premiums. However, Eckbo (2008) shows there are ”no conclusions as to whether offer
premiums are higher, the same, or lower in tender offers than in merger bids.” I thus present
Figure 3: Optimal merger decision and profitability (region plot). The dark shaded area depicts when the bidder acquires
the target firm as the growth option and waits to exercise the investment option at the optimal investment threshold. The light
shaded area depicts when the bidder acquires the target firm as the growth option and immediately exercises the investment
option. The white area depicts when the bidder acquires the target firm as assets in place. I vary the growth rate of cash flows
(µ), the size of the growth option (pi), and the issuance cost of financing (ιd). Panels A and D define the conditions for the global
optimizer merger threshold as defined in Proposition 1. Panels B and E define the conditions for the friendly merger as defined
in Proposition 2. Panels C and F define the conditions for the hostile takeover as defined in Proposition 4. The parameters are
set as in the previous figure.
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some insights into how competition and the type of offer impact the target’s premiums.
Many empirical studies approximate the takeover premium by using a measure based on
cumulative takeover return.7 I define the cumulative return as a change in stand-alone value
due to the merger option. I therefore express the takeover premium as the cumulative return
that results from a merger option, as a fraction of stand-alone value:
TP =
OM(x, xM , ιd)
OI(x, ιd)
(36)
The stand-alone value of the target firm (OI(x, ιd)) depends on its phase of development.
When it is acquired as a growth option, OI(x, ιd) = VI,D(x, ιd). When it is acquired as assets
in place, OI(x, ιd) = V
+
I,D(x, ιd).
Figure 4 shows the sensitivity of an acquisition premium to volatility (σ). I compare
the premium to the target firm from the merger agreement and hostile takeover when the
acquirer makes an offer in isolation (δ = 0), or when it is subject to the fear of preemption
(δ > 0).
In contrast to previous studies that predict a positive effect of volatility on the cumulative
return, when a merger is exercised in isolation (e.g., Lambrecht (2004)), or in the presence
of competition (e.g., Hackbarth and Miao (2012)), the uncertainty decreases the cumulative
return. Previous studies examined the synergies obtained from combining two firms in a
setting where they were independent of uncertainty (e.g. “size effect” in Lambrecht (2004)).
Then, the main driver of the positive effect of volatility on the cumulative return is the
hysteresis factor. I show here that if the synergies generated depend on uncertainty, then the
increase in volatility can lower the cumulative return. This effect is driven primarily by the
fact that synergies depend on capital structure. Optimal leverage decreases with uncertainty,
and thus the synergies related to a firm’s financial structure decrease.
The target firm’s premium depends on its development phase. The premium is higher
when it is acquired as a growth option (dotted line). Note that an acquirer only decides to
buy the target firm as a growth option when the level of uncertainty is relatively low.
7Eckbo (2008)
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Figure 4: Acquisition premium to the target firm as a function of volatility. The panels depict when the acquirer
buys the target firm as 1) a growth option, and waits to exercise the investment option at the optimal investment threshold
(dotted line), 2) a growth option, and immediately exercises the investment option (solid line), or 3) assets in place (dashed
line).
I also show the importance of the dynamics embedded into the acquisition decision of the
acquirer. The premium to the target firm is higher in the case of the merger agreement offer
if the target firm is acquired earlier and in the form of a growth option. If the target firm is
acquired as assets in place, then the premium from the takeover offer is higher. The fear of
preemption increases premiums in the case of a merger agreement. In the case of a takeover
offer, the premium increases because of the bidder’s preemption fears, and acquirers target
firm as a growth option. This is consistent with evidence in Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010),
who show that competition increases the bid premium.
In Figure 7, I report the sensitivity of the acquisition premium to issuance cost (ιd). The
34
0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Ιd
P
r
e
m
iu
m
AL Merger Agreement H∆=0L
0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Ιd
P
r
e
m
iu
m
BL Hostile Takeover H∆=0L
0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Ιd
P
r
e
m
iu
m
CL Merger Agreement H∆=1L
0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Ιd
P
r
e
m
iu
m
DL Hostile Takeover H∆=1L
Figure 5: Acquisition premium to the target firm as a function of the issuance cost. The panels depict when the
acquirer buys the target firm as 1) a growth option, and waits to exercise the investment option at the optimal investment
threshold (dotted line), 2) a growth option, and immediately exercises the investment option (solid line), or 3) assets in place
(dashed line).
increase in the issuance cost of financing also increases the takeover premium to the target
firm, because higher issuance cost increases the synergies. Thus, there is also a larger pie to
share, and the target firm obtains more as a fraction of its stand-alone value. Competition
between bidders increases takeover premiums.
Figure 8 depicts the sensitivity of the acquisition premium to the bankruptcy cost (ϕ). If
ϕ is low, then debtholders can recover the assets of the firm at bankruptcy. In other words,
firms tend to have more tangible assets on their balance sheet. If ϕ is high, then debtholders
cannot costlessly recover the assets of the firm at bankruptcy. In this case, firm has more
intangible assets on their balance sheet. The model thus predicts that the takeover premiums
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Figure 6: Acquisition premium to the target firm as a function of the bankruptcy cost. The panels depict when
the acquirer buys the target firm as 1) a growth option, and waits to exercise the investment option at the optimal investment
threshold (dotted line), 2) a growth option, and immediately exercises the investment option (solid line), or 3) assets in place
(dashed line).
are higher for firms with more tangible assets. I do not report other comparative statics with
respect to the growth rate of cash flow (µ) or the interest rate (r) because they share the
same predictions about takeover premiums with other models (e.g., Hackbarth and Miao
(2012)).
7.2 Acquirer return
From the acquirer’s perspective its expected gains are defined as a change in stand-alone
value due to the merger option. I therefore express the acquirer return as the cumulative
return that results from a merger option, as a fraction of stand-alone value:
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AR =
OM(x, xM , ιd)
OI(x, 0)
(37)
The stand-alone value of the target firm is worth for the acquirer - OI(x, 0) and depends
on its phase of development. When it is acquired as a growth option, OI(x, 0) = VI,D(x, 0).
When it is acquired as assets in place, OI(x, 0) = V +I,D(x, 0).
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Σ
A
c
q
u
ir
er
R
e
t
u
r
n
AL No Preemption H∆=0L
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
Σ
A
c
q
u
ir
er
R
e
t
u
r
n
BL With Preemption H∆>0L
Figure 7: Acquirer return as a function of volatility. The panels depict when the acquirer buys the target firm as 1)
a growth option, and waits to exercise the investment option at the optimal investment threshold (dotted line), 2) a growth
option, and immediately exercises the investment option (solid line), or 3) assets in place (dashed line) in the from of the merger
agreement (blue) or hostile takeover (red line).
Figure 7 shows the sensitivity of an acquirer return to volatility (σ) from the merger
agreement (blue) and hostile takeover (red line) when the acquirer makes an offer in isolation
(δ = 0), or when it is subject to the fear of preemption (δ > 0). Similarly to the target’s
premium the acquirer return decreases in uncertainty when there is no fear of preemption and
the acquirer expected gains are higher when under the merger agreement offer. Otherwise in
the case of the hostile takeover its return is close to zero.
The acquirer return in the presence of the competition is lower almost equal to zero. If
the target firm is acquired as a growth option, the acquirer’s return initially increases in
uncertainty. This is consistent with previous studies suggesting that the hysteresis factor
dominates. However, there is a kink when the target’s growth option can be immediately
exercised and since then acquirer’s return decreases in uncertainty. The hostile takeover is
preferred than the merger agreement only for lower levels of uncertainty.
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Figure 8: Acquirer return as a function of the issuance cost. The panels depict when the acquirer buys the target
firm as 1) a growth option, and waits to exercise the investment option at the optimal investment threshold (dotted line), 2) a
growth option, and immediately exercises the investment option (solid line), or 3) assets in place (dashed line) in the from of
the merger agreement (blue line) or hostile takeover (red line).
Figure 8 shows the sensitivity of an acquirer return to the issuance cost (σ) from the
merger agreement (blue) and hostile takeover (red) when the acquirer makes an offer in
isolation (δ = 0), or when it is subject to the fear of preemption (δ > 0). When the offer
is exercised in isolation the acquirer return increases when the issuance cost increases due
to the positive effect of the issuance cost increase on synergies. Also, when there is no fear
of preemption the merger offer is preferred than the hostile takeover as it generates higher
return for the acquirer.
In the presence of competition the acquirer return is close to zero. The acquirer return
from hostile takeover offer is higher than the one form merger offer when the issuance cost
is high.
Figure 9 shows the sensitivity of an acquirer return to the bankruptcy cost (σ) from
the merger agreement (blue) and hostile takeover (red) when the acquirer makes an offer in
isolation (δ = 0), or when it is subject to the fear of preemption (δ > 0). The acquirer return
decreases in bankruptcy cost when the offer is exercised in isolation and the merger offer is
preferred than the hostile takeover as it generates higher return for the acquirer. Acquirer
return is higher when buying a target with more tangible assets.
In the presence of competition the acquirer return is close to zero yet the merger offer
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Figure 9: Acquirer return as a function of the bankruptcy cost. The panels depict when the acquirer buys the target
firm as 1) a growth option, and waits to exercise the investment option at the optimal investment threshold (dotted line), 2) a
growth option, and immediately exercises the investment option (solid line), or 3) assets in place (dashed line) in the from of
the merger agreement (blue line) or hostile takeover (red line).
still generates a higher return for the acquirer than hostile takeover.
8. Conclusion
This paper presents a dynamic model of buyouts, where the bidder’s decision is a sequential
option under the threat of preemption. The bidder can acquire the target firm as a growth
option or as assets in place. The synergies arise due to asymmetric access to financing.
The acquirer’s optimal choice depends on the magnitude of financial synergies, the level of
preemption fear, and the offer type. The target firm’s development phase affects the optimal
merger threshold, the division of synergies, and the takeover premium.
The model shows that the synergies created by providing cheap financing to the target firm
can be decomposed into three effects: limited liability, leverage, and asymmetric financing.
The magnitude and importance of these synergies depend on whether the target firm is
acquired as a growth option or as physical assets. If the target firm is acquired at an early
stage of development, the synergies, the acquirer can realize are related to the asymmetric
financing and leverage effects. However, once the target firm has commercialized its growth
options, and its assets in place generate profits, the synergies are related to the leverage effect
and the limited liability effect.
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When the bidder faces competition, in the form of preemption fears, it is more likely to
acquire the target firm at an earlier stage of development when the growth option remains
unexercised. Furthermore, my framework predicts that the fear of preemption speeds up
the timing of a merger agreement, while the timing of a hostile takeover converges to the
global optimizer merger threshold. My analysis reveals additional insights into the role of
competition in the bidding process. When the bidder has preemption fears, friendly mergers
tend to be exercised too early. When the fear of preemption is high, hostile takeovers converge
to the first-best merger threshold. Takeover premiums to the target firm are higher when the
firm is acquired at an earlier stage of development, and when the bidder is subject to the fear
of preemption. In contrast, acquirer return is lower when subject to the fear of preemption.
The main empirical predictions of the model are as follows. First, this study implies a
positive correlation between the number of bidders for a target firm and the likelihood it will
be acquired as a growth option (or a production opportunity). Therefore, firms with higher
levels of R&D on their balance sheets are acquired earlier than firms with more physical
assets. Second, there is also a positive correlation between the issuance cost of financing for
the target firm, and the likelihood that mergers are motivated by financial synergies. The
model predicts more merger activity of financial bidders during economic booms when there
is a high spread in the cost of financing between the acquirer and the target.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1
To work out the optimal investment threshold of the innovating firm I have to solve the
problem backwards. First, I solve for the post-investment values when the innovating target
firm can rely on capital markets financing. Second, I derive the ex ante-investment values
and then closed form solutions for the optimal investment threshold.
When the innovative firm financed the cost of investment with risky debt, its assets in
place generate the after tax cash-flow (1−τ)pi less the fixed coupon cI,D paid to bondholders.
Assuming that r is a risk free rate and agents are risk-neutral, the firm’s equity E+I,D and
debt B+I,D must satisfy:
rE+I,D = (1− τ)pix− (1− τ)cI,D +
d
d∆
E[E+I,D,t+∆]
∣∣∣
∆=0
(A.1.)
rB+I,D = cI,D +
d
d∆
E[B+I,D,t+∆]
∣∣∣
∆=0
(A.2.)
Assuming E+I,D and B
+
I,D are twice-continuously differentiable functions of the state variable
xt, then by applying Ito’s lemma I obtain:
rE+I,D(x) = (1− τ)pix− (1− τ)cI,D +
∂E+I,D(x)
∂x
xµ+
∂2E+I,D(x)
∂2x
x2
σ2
2
(A.3.)
rB+I,D(x) = cI,D +
∂B+I,D(x)
∂x
xµ+
∂2B+I,D(x)
∂2x
x2
σ2
2
(A.4.)
The ordinary differential equations have solutions as follows:
E+I,D(x) =
(1− τ)pix
r − µ
− (1− τ)cI,D + A1x
β + A2x
λ (A.5.)
B+I,D(x) =
cI,D
r
+ A3x
β + A4x
λ (A.6.)
where β > 1 and λ < 0 are the positive and negative root of the equation: 1/2σ2z(z − 1) +
µz − r = 0.
The constants A1 and A2 are determined by the following conditions for equityholders.
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The first condition stipulates that at the default threshold, xI,D, the equityholders are left
with nothing and their claims are equal to: E+I,D(xI,D) = 0. Second, by a no-bubble condition
states that when the state variable goes to infinity the equityholders claims approach the
unlimited liability value: limxt→∞E
+
I,D(xt) = (1− τ)pix/(r − µ)− (1− τ)cI,D/r.
The constants A3 and A4 are determined by the following conditions for bondholders.
First, at the default threshold, xI,D, the bondholders are left with the liquidation value,
B+I,D(xI,D) = (1 − ϕ)φxI,D/(r − µ). Second, when the state variable goes to infinity the
bondholders claims approach the unlimited liability value: limxt→∞B
+
I,D(xt) = cI,D/r. These
necessary conditions yield the solutions for equity and debt when x ≥ xI,D:
E+I,D(x, 0) = (1− τ)
[
pix
r − µ
−
cI,D
r
]
−
[
(1− τ)pixI,D
r − µ
−
(1− τ)cI,D
r
](
x
xI,D
)λ
(A.7.)
B+I,D(x, 0) =
cI,D
r
−
(
cI,D
r
−
(1− ϕ)φxI,D
r − µ
)(
x
xI,D
)λ
(A.8.)
The firm value is the sum of equity and debt given in Eq. (7) in Lemma 1. Equityholders
choose the default threshold when the equity value is maximized w.r.t. x which is evaluated
at x = xI,D
8:
∂E+I,D(x)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=xI,D
= 0 (A.9.)
which gives the solution for the closure threshold in Lemma 1. Next, I substitute for xI,D in
V +I,D(x). I determine the closed-form solution for the optimal coupon cI,D(x) by maximizing
the firm value (the root of the first order condition):
∂[V +I,D(x, 0)− ιdB
+
I,D(x, 0)]
∂cI,D(x)
= 0 (A.10.)
Inserting values for cI,D and xI,D the post-investment equity and debt are:
E+I,D(x, ιd) =
pix(1− τ)
(
1− λ+ λΩ−1/λ − Ω−1
)
Ω1/λ
λ(r − µ)
(A.11.)
8Equityholders can cover operating loses by injecting more capital.
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B+I,D(x, ιd) =
xΩ
1−λ
λ (pi(1− ιd)(1− λ) + (1− (1− ιd)λ− τ)φ(−1 + ϕ))
(r − µ)(τ − ιd)
(A.12.)
where 1/λ
[
1− λ+ λΩ−1/λ − Ω−1
]
> 0 is always satisfied. The post-investment firm value
net of issuance cost is:
V +I,D(x, ιd) = V
+
I,D(x, 0)− ιdB
+
I,D(x, 0) = xΨ (A.13.)
where Ψ =
[
pix
(
1− τ + (τ − ιd)(Ω)
1/λ
)]
/(r − µ). Lemma 1 follows.
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Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 2
In the continuation region, before the investment exercise, the innovative firm is a growth
option and does not generate any cash flows. The equityholders only obtain capital gains.
The firm value has to satisfy the following Bellman equation:
rVI,j =
d
d∆
E[VI,j,t+∆]
∣∣∣
∆=0
for j = E,D. (B.1.)
Using Ito’s lemma one can show that the firm value before investment satisfies:
rVI,j(xt) =
∂VI,D(x)
∂x
xµ+
∂VI,D(x)
∂x
x2
σ2
2
(B.2.)
The ordinary differential equation has the solution as follows:
VI,j(xt) = A5x
β + A6x
λ (B.3.)
where β > 1 and λ < 0 are the positive and negative root of the equation: 1/2σ2z(z −
1) + µz − r = 0. The constants are derived as the solutions to no-bubble condition, limiting
A6 = 0, and the value matching condition that at the time of investment the value of equity
has to be equal the payoff from investment. When the capital outlay is financed with equity
the following expression has to be satisfied:
VI,E(xI,E) = (1− ιe)V
+
I,E(xI,E)− κ (B.4.)
and when the investment cost is financed by raising debt:
VI,D(xI,D) = V
+
I,D(xI,D, ιd)− ιdB
+
I,D(xI,D, ιd)− κ = ΨxI,D − κ (B.5.)
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Then, the smooth-pasting conditions to ensure that the investment occurs along the optimal
path for investment financed with equity and debt respectively are:
∂VI,E(x)/∂x
∣∣∣
x=xI,E
= ∂(1− ιe)V
+
I,E(x)/∂x
∣∣∣
x=xI,E
(B.6.)
∂VI,D(x)/∂x
∣∣∣
x=xI,D
= ∂(1− ιd)V
+
I,E(x, ιd)/∂x
∣∣∣
x=xI,D
= Ψ (B.7.)
Lemma 2 follows.
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Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 1
Over the continuation interval investors having an option to merge obtain capital gains and
the following condition has to be satisfied:
rOM =
d
d∆
E[OMt+∆]
∣∣∣
∆=0
(C.1.)
Assuming OM is a twice-continuously differentiable function of the state variable xt, then
by applying Ito’s lemma I obtain a second-order ODE equation:
rOM(x) = µX
∂OM(x)
∂X
+
1
2
σ2X2
∂2OM(x)
∂2X
(C.2.)
The ordinary differential equation has a solution as follows:
OM(x) = A7x
β + A8x
λ (C.3.)
This equation can be solved subject to boundary conditions. The value matching condition
stipulates that at the optimal merger threshold the value of the merger option equals to the
realized net synergies: OM(xM , xM , ιd) = ∆(xM , ιd) − KM − KT . A no-bubble condition
implies that: limxt→0OM(xt) = 0. The resulting value of the merger option conditional on
the merger trigger satisfies the following equation:
OM(x, xM , ιd) = (OI(xM , 0)−OI(xM , ιd)−KM −KT )
(
x
xM
)β
(C.4.)
The first-order condition ensures that the merger occurs along optimal path, and ∂OM(xM , ιd)/∂xM =
0. The optimal threshold xM satisfies the following condition:
− β (OI(xM , 0)−OI(xM , ιd)−KM −KT ) + xM
∂ (OI(xM , 0)−OI(xM , ιd))
∂xM
= 0 (C.5.)
I solve the above equation for the following cases when (the logic is similar to Chapter 10 on
sequential investment of Dixit and Pindyck (1994)):
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1) xM < x
o
I < x
c
I
If the acquirer buys the target firm as a growth option and waits to exercise the investment
at the optimal trigger, the merger threshold is the solution to the following F.O.C.:
xβM
κ
β − 1
[
1
Hβκ
]β
(Φβ −Ψβ)−HβKM −HβKT = 0 (C.6.)
where Φ = Ψ(ιd = 0). The optimal threshold when the acquirer buys the target firm as a
growth option is:
xM = Hβκ
[
β(KM +KT )
κ(Φβ −Ψβ)
] 1
β
(C.7.)
And is satisfied only when:
xM < x
o
I ⇐⇒
KM +KT
κ
<
Φβ −Ψβ
βΦβ
(C.8.)
2) xoI ≤ xM < x
c
I
If the acquirer buys the target firm as a growth option and exercises the investment option
immediately, the merger threshold is the solution to the following F.O.C.:
xMΦ− κ− x
β
M
κ
β − 1
[
Ψ
Hβκ
]β
−HβKM −HβKT = 0 (C.9.)
The above equation requires a numerical solution for xM . And is satisfied only when:
xoI ≤ xM < x
c
I ⇐⇒
Φβ −Ψβ
βΦβ
≤
KM +KT
κ
<
Φ−Ψ
Ψ
(C.10.)
3) xoI < x
c
I ≤ xM
If the acquirer buys the target firm as assets in place, the merger threshold is the solution to
the following F.O.C.:
xM(Φ−Ψ)−HβKM −HβKT = 0 (C.11.)
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The optimal threshold when the acquirer buys the target firm as assets in place is:
xM =
HβKM +HβKT
Φ−Ψ
(C.12.)
And is satisfied only when:
xcI ≤ xM ⇐⇒
Φ−Ψ
Ψ
≤
KM +KT
κ
(C.13.)
To prove that xM is defined over all possible regions and no discontinuities are present one can
check that: when xoI = xM then
KM+KT
κ
= Φ
β−Ψβ
βΦβ
, and when xcI = xM then
Φ−Ψ
Ψ
= KM+KT
κ
.
Proposition 1 follows.
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Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 2 and 3
The probability of one jump in the Poisson process is:
Pr(C = 1) = δte−δt (D.1.)
Therefore, the expected time before competitor’s arrival is:
E[TC ] =
1
δ
(D.2.)
The option to merge with the target can be only exercised before the competitor arrives at
time (TC). Therefore, if t < TC bidder can still exercise the option to merge. Otherwise, if
t > TC the competing bidder takes over the target firm. Bidder maximizes the value of the
option to merge, at time TM , which is now:
OMB(x) = max
TM
E[1TM<TCe
−rTM (sBOI(xM , 0)−KM)] (D.3.)
1a is the indicator function of an event a. 1a = 1 if t < TC and 1a = 0 otherwise. The
Bellman equation over the continuation region is:
rOMB(x)dt = E[dOMB(x)] (D.4.)
Using Ito’s lemma one can show that the value of the option to acquire before exercise and
project expiry has to satisfy (where the jump is of a fixed size):
rOMB(x) = µX
∂OMB(x)
∂X
+
1
2
σ2X2
∂2OMB(x)
∂2X
+ δ(OMJB(x)−OMB(x)) (D.5.)
As OMJB(x) = 0 equation can be written as:
rOMB(x) = µX
∂OMB(x)
∂X
+
1
2
σ2X2
∂2OMB(x)
∂2X
− δOMB(x) (D.6.)
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The left hand side of the equation represents the required rate of return of investing in the
option to acquire. The right hand side shows the capital gains that investors get per unit of
time and the last term reflects the effect of preemption. The ordinary differential equation
has solution as follows:
OMB(xt) = A9x
ξ
t + A10x
υ
t (D.7.)
where ξ > 1 and υ < 0 are the solutions of the equation: 1/2σ2z(z − 1) + µz − r − δ = 0.
This equation can be solved subject to boundary conditions. The value matching condition
stipulates that at the optimal merger threshold the value of the option equals the merger
payoff,
OMB(xM) = sBOI(xM , 0)−KM (D.8.)
and no-bubble condition eliminates constant A10:
limx→0OMB(x) = 0 (D.9.)
The value of the merger option conditional on the merger trigger satisfies the following
equation for the bidder:
OMB(x, xM(sB), ιd) = (sBOI(xM(sB), 0)−KM)
(
x
xM(sB)
)ξ
(D.10.)
where xM(sB) is the reaction function of the bidder dependent on the share sB. Following
similar arguments, where now δ = 0, the merger option for the target firm satisfies the
following ODE:
rOMT (x) = µX
∂OMT (x)
∂X
+
1
2
σ2X2
∂2OMT (x)
∂2X
(D.11.)
The left hand side of the equation represents the required rate of return of investing in the
option to acquire. The right hand side shows the capital gains that investors get per unit of
time. The option value for the target firm is:
OMT (x, xM(sT ), ιd) = (sTOI(xM(sT ), 0)−OI(xM(sT ), ιd)−KT )
(
x
xM(sT )
)β
(D.12.)
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where xM(sT ) is the reaction function of the bidder dependent on the share sT . To determine
the optimal merger threshold I calculate reaction functions for the bidder and the target
dependent on the share in the new entity. The F.O.C. for the bidder is as follows:
− ξ (sBOI(xM(sB), 0)−KM) + xM(sB)
∂ (sBOI(xM(sB), 0)
∂xM(sB)
= 0 (D.13.)
and for the target:
− β (sTOI(xM(sT ), 0)−OI(xM(sT ), ιd)−KT )+
+ xM(sT )
∂ (sTOI(xM(sT ), 0)−OI(xM(sT ), ιd))
∂xM(sT )
= 0 (D.14.)
The optimal threshold xM is the solution to the following condition: xM(sB) = xM(sT ). I
solve the above optimization problem for the following cases discussed in Section 4.
1) xM < x
o
I < x
c
I
If the bidder buys the target firm as a growth option and waits to exercise the investment
at the optimal trigger, the merger threshold is the solution to the following F.O.C.s, for the
bidder:
xβM
κ
β − 1
[
1
Hβκ
]β
sBΦ
β −HξKM = 0 (D.15.)
and for the target:
xβM
κ
β − 1
[
1
Hβκ
]β
(sTΦ
β −Ψβ)−HβKT = 0 (D.16.)
The reaction function of the bidder is:
xM(sB) =
Hβκ
Φ
[
(β − 1)HξKM
κsB
] 1
β
(D.17.)
and the reaction function of the target:
xM(sT ) =
Hβκ
Φ
[
(β − 1)HβKT
κ(sT − (Ψ/Φ)β)
] 1
β
(D.18.)
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The optimal ownership is calculated as the solution to: xM(sB) = xM(sT ) and sT = 1− sB.
sB =
HξKM(Φ
β −Ψβ)
Φβ(HξKM +HβKT )
(D.19.)
After substituting I obtain the merger threshold when the bidder is subject to competition
as:
xM = Hβκ
[
β(KM +KT )
κ(Φβ −Ψβ)
] 1
β
(D.20.)
And is satisfied only when:
xM < x
o
I ⇐⇒
Hξ
Hβ
KM +KT
κ
<
Φβ −Ψβ
βΦβ
(D.21.)
2) xoI < xM < x
c
I
If the acquirer buys the target firm as a growth option and exercises the investment option
immediately, the merger threshold is the solution to the following F.O.C.:
sBxMΦ−HξKM = 0 (D.22.)
The reaction function when the bidder buys the target firm as a growth option and immedi-
ately exercises is:
xM(sB) = Hξ
KM
sBΦ
(D.23.)
The F.O.C. for the target firm is:
sTxMΦ− x
β
M
κ
β − 1
[
Ψ
Hβκ
]β
−HβKT = 0 (D.24.)
The reaction function for the target xM(sT ) requires a numerical solution. Then the own-
ership share can be derived as the solution to: xM(sB) = xM(sT ). And is satisfied only
when:
xoI ≤ xM < x
c
I ⇐⇒
Φβ −Ψβ
βΦβ
≤
Hξ
Hβ
KM +KT
κ
<
Φ−Ψ
Ψ
(D.25.)
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3) xoI < x
c
I < xM
If the acquirer buys the target firm as assets in place, the merger threshold is the solution to
the following F.O.C.:
sBxAΦ−HξKM = 0 (D.26.)
The F.O.C. for the target firm is:
sBxMΦ− xMΨ−HβKT = 0 (D.27.)
The reaction function when the bidder buys assets in place is:
xM(sB) = Hξ
KM
sBΦ
(D.28.)
and for the target:
xM(sT ) = Hβ
KT
sTΦ−Ψ
(D.29.)
The share is calculated as the solution of xM(sT ) = xM(sB):
sB =
HξKM(Φ−Ψ)
(HξKM +HβKT )Φ
(D.30.)
The after substituting I obtain the merger threshold when the bidder is subject to competi-
tion:
xM(δ > 0) =
HξKM +HβKT
Φ−Ψ
< xM(δ = 0) (D.31.)
And is satisfied only when:
xcI < xM(δ > 0)⇐⇒
Φ−Ψ
Ψ
≤
Hξ
Hβ
KM +KT
κ
(D.32.)
Proposition 2 and 3 follow.
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Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 4
Following similar arguments as in in previous appendix for Proposition 2 I can show that a
takeover option, denoted as OT(x), satisfies the following equation, which is for the bidder:
OTB(x, xM(sB)) = (sBOI(xM(sB), 0)−KM)
(
x
xM(sB)
)ξ
(E.1.)
and for the target:
OTT (x, sT (xM), sT )) = (sT (xM)OI(xM , 0)−OI(xM , ιd)−KT )
(
x
xM
)β
(E.2.)
In contrast to merger agreement the takeover is solved as a Stackelberg game, where the
target decides on the ownership share (sT ) and then the bidder decides on the timing of the
takeover conditional on the share that the target firm obtains. The smooth-pasting condition
ensures that the takeover occurs along optimal path, and ∂OTB(xM)/∂xM = 0. The bidder’s
takeover reaction function xM(sB) satisfies the following condition:
− ξ (sBOI(xM , 0)−KM) + xM
∂sBOI(xM , 0)
∂xM
= 0 (E.3.)
The target firm then decides on the share. Its optimization problem can be formulated as
maxsT OTT (x, sT (xM), sT ) or when I substitute for sT (xM) the value derived from Eq. (E.3.)
it can be written as maxxM OTT (x, xM , sT (xM)). Solving the latter optimization problem the
takeover threshold is the solution to the following equation:
− β (sTOI(xM , 0)−OI(xM , ιd)−KT ) + xM
∂ (sTOI(xM , 0)−OI(xM , ιd))
∂xM
= 0 (E.4.)
I solve the above optimization problem for the following cases:
1) xM < x
o
I < x
c
I
If the acquirer buys the target firm as a growth option and waits to exercise the investment
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at the optimal trigger, the takeover threshold is the solution to the following F.O.C.:
sBx
β
M
κ
β − 1
[
1
Hβκ
]β
Φβ −HξKM = 0 (E.5.)
The reaction function when the bidder buys the target firm as a growth option is:
xM(sB) =
Hβκ
Φ
[
(β − 1)HξKM
κsB
] 1
β
(E.6.)
or rewriting:
sB(xM) =
HξKM
(xM
1
Hβκ
Φ)β
β − 1
κ
(E.7.)
Now substituting for sB into the F.O.C. for the target firm:
xβM
κ
β − 1
[
1
Hβκ
]β
(Φβ −Ψβ)−HβHξKM −HβKT = 0 (E.8.)
The optimal takeover threshold when the acquirer buys the target firms as a growth option
is:
xM = Hβκ
[
(β − 1)(HβHξKM +HβKT )
κ(Φβ −Ψβ)
] 1
β
(E.9.)
The optimal share sB is:
sB =
HξKM(Φ
β −Ψβ)
Φβ(HβHξKM +HβKT )
(E.10.)
And the above is satisfied only when:
xM < x
o
I ⇐⇒
HξKM +KT
κ
<
Φβ −Ψβ
βΦβ
(E.11.)
2) xoI < xM < x
c
I
If the acquirer buys the target firm as a growth option and exercises the investment option
immediately, the takeover threshold is the solution to the following F.O.C.:
xMsBΦ−HξKM = 0 (E.12.)
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The reaction function when the bidder buys the target firm as a growth option followed by
immediate exercise is:
xM(sB) =
HξKM
sBΦ
(E.13.)
or rewriting:
sB(xM) =
HξKM
ΦxM
(E.14.)
Now substituting for sB into the F.O.C. for the target firm:
xMΦ− x
β
M
κ
β − 1
[
Ψ
Hβκ
]β
−HβHξKM −HβKT = 0 (E.15.)
The above equation requires a numerical solution for the optimal merger threshold xM . And
is satisfied only when:
xoI ≤ xM < x
c
I ⇐⇒
Φβ −Ψβ
βΦβ
≤
HξKM +KT
κ
<
Φ−Ψ
Ψ
(E.16.)
3) xoI < x
c
I < xM
If the acquirer buys the target firm as assets in place, the takeover threshold is the solution
to the following F.O.C.:
− ξ (sBxMΦ−KM) + sBxMΦ = 0 (E.17.)
The reaction function when bidder buys assets in place is:
xM(sB) =
HξKM
sBΦ
(E.18.)
or rewriting:
sB(xM) =
HξKM
ΦxM
(E.19.)
Substituting into F.O.C. for the target firm gives:
xM(Φ−Ψ)−HβHξKM −HβKT = 0 (E.20.)
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The optimal takeover threshold is:
xM =
HξHβKM +HβKT
Φ−Ψ
(E.21.)
The ownership is shared according to the following rule sT = 1− sB, where:
sB =
HξKM(Φ−Ψ)
ΦHβ(HβHξKM +HβKT )
(E.22.)
Above is satisfied only when:
xcI < xM ⇐⇒
Φ−Ψ
Ψ
≤
HξKM +KT
κ
(E.23.)
Proposition 4 follows.
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